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The proliferation of mobile computing and communica-
tion devices are driving a revolutionary change in our
information society. Among all the applications and
services run by mobile devices, network connections
and corresponding data services are without doubt the
most demanded services by mobile users. A MANET is
a continuously self-configuring, infrastructure-less net-
work of mobile devices connected without wires, which
makes it ideal for the present scenario. But, due to lack
of any centralized infrastructure and access to trusted
authorities, the security in MANET poses a huge threat.
The prominent routing protocols we know are gener-
ally designed for environments where the nodes within
a network are non-malicious. Due to the vulnerable
nature of the mobile ad hoc network, there are numerous
security threats that disturb its development. We propose
a protocol for MANETs named “Administrator and Fi-
delity Based Secure Routing Protocol” (AFSR), which
ensures secure routing through the network: by electing
an Administrator node on the basis of Willingness and
Fidelity, after which a node only communicates to that
secure Admin node. This selection of secured admin
nodes results in mitigation of various threats. We
have evaluated our proposed protocol by simulating and
comparing in GloMoSim.
ACM CCS (2012)Classification: Networks→ Network
properties → Network security → Mobile and wireless
security;
Networks → Networks protocols → Network layer
protocols → Routing protocols;
Networks → Network types → Ad hoc Networks;
Networks → Network performance evaluation → Net-
work simulation
Keywords: MANET, routing, willingness, fidelity, secu-
rity, attack, proactive, GloMoSim
1. Introduction
An ad hoc network consists of wireless devices
that may be mobile and can communicate with-
out the need of a fixed infrastructure. In a Mo-
bile Ad Hoc Network (MANET), the network
topology may change dynamically since nodes
can move in an unpredictable manner. Nodes
are free to move at any speed in any direction
and join or leave the network at any time. In [1]
Agrawal and Zeng formally define a MANET as
an autonomous system of nodes or Mobile Sta-
tions (MSs) connected by a wireless medium.
MANETdiffers from conventional wireless net-
works, such as cellular networks and IEEE
802.11 (infrastructure mode) networks. The
latter ones are self-containing network nodes,
which communicate directly with each other,
without relying on centralized infrastructures
such as base stations. In a MANET, every node
is able to communicate directlywith other nodes
within its range. Nodes with direct communica-
tion are called neighbors. Any pair of nodes not
directly connected, can communicate through a
path formed by other nodes. MANETs are basi-
cally peer-to-peer, multi-hopwireless networks.
The established links can be either symmetric,
links with the same characteristics in both di-
rections, or asymmetric, links with different
characteristics in each direction. Information
packets are transmitted in a store-and-forward
manner by intermediate nodes, i.e., every node
acts as a router.
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Figure 1(a), presents an example of a wireless
network. Every pair ofMSs has to communicate
through the BS. Figure 1(b) shows an example
of a network in ad hoc mode. MSs within the
same range can establish direct communication.
Ad hoc networks can operate in isolation or may
have gateways to a fixed network.
Figure 1. Examples of a cellular and an ad hoc network.
MANET can be broadly classified into 3 sec-
tions Proactive, Reactive and Hybrid, as re-
viewed in [2]. The decentralized nature of
MANETs provides additional robustness against
the single point of failure in centralized ap-
proaches, e.g., base stations or access points.
MANETs can be deployed in scenarios where
it is almost impossible to set up and maintain a
wired network, like in the case of a disaster, bat-
tlefield or rescue operation. Some limitations of
MANET, such as distributed network, dynamic
topology, limited bandwidth, energy constraint
and limited physical security, make routing in
MANET a big challenge. We try to solve these
problems through our proposed protocol – An
Administrator and Fidelity Based Secure Rout-
ing (AFSR).
AFSR can be used in any application where
security is a major issue since it has many ad-
vantageous features compared to other existing
secure routing protocols. In AFSR each node in
the network selects only one node as an Admin,
from its neighbor table, which will be respon-
sible for its data traffic. Through the process
a secure and reliable Admin node is selected,
which minimizes the chances of packet drops.
As compared to OLSR [3], which selects a set
of MPR nodes, AFSR selects a single ADMIN
node on the basis of Willingness and Fidelity
values, as explained in Section 3. Since the
willingness is a combination of the battery, cov-
erage and link stability of the neighbor nodes, it
decreases the chances of loss of packets. More-
over, these criterion helps us predict a node
which can transfer data from source to desti-
nation with high Packet Delivery Fraction and
low End-to-End Delay.
Energy efficiency is a challenge in networks
like MANET, where the nodes are highly mo-
bile, and frequent route building is required.
Our protocol also includes the remaining battery
power of a node as a decisive factor for Admin
section. Moreover, by selecting only one secure
node as an Admin, we minimize the unneces-
sary multicast of packets to multiple Admins.
Traditional proactive protocols maintain large
routing tables, with multiple paths from itself
to all potential destination nodes. While doing
so, a node also considers some unsecure paths,
through which the packets will eventually get
lost. AFSR aims to minimize this arduous task
of maintaining a big routing table, by select-
ing the most secured paths and a single reliable
Admin node.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In
Section 2 we review the existing secure routing
protocols. In Section 3 we explain the AFSR
model, followed by the overall algorithm in Sec-
tion 4. In Section 5 we explain the results and
discussion followed by conclusion in Section 6.
2. Related Work
In recent times, many secure protocols have
been proposed to meet up with the different
kinds of attacks, as mentioned in [4]. The pro-
posed secure protocols can be broadly classified
into four sections as mentioned in Figure 2 [5].
Figure 2. Classification of secure MANET
Routing Protocols.
The basic routing security schemes provide au-
thentication services that guard against modi-
fication and replaying of routing control mes-
sages. However, they do not attempt to pro-
vide solutions for issues such as the dropping of
packets by selfish or malicious nodes.
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In [6] an inter-router authentication scheme for
securing AODV [7] routing protocol against ex-
ternal attacks was introduced. The scheme is
based on the assumption that the nodes in the
network mutually trust each other and it em-
ploys public key cryptography for providing the
security services. SRP [8] assumes the exis-
tence of a security associate between a node
initiating a route request query and the sought
destination. SAODV [9] uses two mechanisms
to secure AODV: digital signatures to authen-
ticate non-mutable fields of the routing con-
trol messages and one-way hash chains to se-
cure hop count information, which increases
the overhead. ARAN [10] uses digital certifi-
cates to secure the routing control messages.
ARAN has solved for some attacks, but it is
silent about some attacks like black hole attack,
denial of service attack, etc. ARAN requires
extra memory, it has high processing overhead
for encryption, and does not use hop count, so
the discovered path may not be optimal. All
the above mentioned protocols have not con-
sidered battery as a parameter for choosing a
secured node, hence making them less reliable.
OLSR is vulnerable to wormhole attack, but
through Secure OLSR [11], wormhole detective
mechanism and authentication are employed to
strengthen the neighbor relationship establish-
ment. It uses hash-chain and digital signature to
protect the routing packets. However, the num-
ber of Admin nodes selected is high. SEAD
(Secure Efficient Ad hoc Distance vector rout-
ing protocol) [12] has presented a design based
on DSDV [13], which uses one-way hash chains
for authenticating the hop count values. It uses
authentication mechanisms like TESLA, HORS
or TIK for authenticating the sender. With the
help of message authentication codes it is able
to authenticate the sender’s routing messages;
however, the disadvantage is that it is based on
the assumption that shared secret keys are estab-
lished among each pair of nodes and the nodes
should have time synchronized clocks. I-SEAD
[14] protocol is an improvement over the SEAD
protocol, but still fails to solve the QoS related
issues. ARIADNE [15] secures DSR protocol
[16]. The routing messages are authenticated by
message authentication codes. This demands
time synchronization hardware, such that the
release of the secret keys can be synchronized.
For broadcasting RREQ packets it uses TESLA
broadcast authentication protocol distributed to
all the nodes through a key distribution center.
The advantage is that it uses shared key and dig-
ital signature to authenticate messages. It can
even detect changes in the node list due to the
online central key distribution service. The dis-
advantage is that attacks like cache poisoning
cannot be prevented and the key exchange is a
very complicated and heavy process. SPAAR
(Secure Position Aided Ad hoc Routing Pro-
tocol) [17] is a scheme which was designed to
consider a hostile environment. The transmis-
sion procedure is quite similar to that of ARAN,
and requires that each node has a GPS locator
with it to determine its position. The packets
are only accepted between neighboring nodes
one hop away from each other. A central server
generates certificates for authentication. The
disadvantage is that the server needs to be un-
compromised; moreover, it uses GPS locator,
which demands extra hardware.
The trust based secure routing schemes assign
quantitative or qualitative trust values of the
nodes in the network, based on observed be-
havior of the nodes. The trust values are used
as additional metrics for the routing protocols.
SDAR [18] utilizes a trust management system
which assigns trust values to nodes based on ob-
served behavior of the nodes, along with recom-
mendations from other nodes. SDAR requires
each node to construct two symmetric keys, and
shares one with its neighbors that have high trust
value and the other with its neighbors that have
medium trust values. Protection against packet
dropping is not provided by [19]. SLSP’s [20]
security considerations are limited to individual
Byzantine attackers. The protocol is not se-
cure when challenged by two or more colluding
nodes. Similarly, ATSR [21] and SMRR [22]
have provided a secured approach by employ-
ing proactive routing, where the most trustwor-
thy node is selected. In both protocols battery
has not been considered during selection of a
trustworthy node. Moreover, in SMRR more
than one nodes are chosen as Admin, which is
not so in this protocol. SAR (Security-Aware
Ad Hoc Routing) [23] classifies nodes based on
their trust level. Nodes that have the same clas-
sification share a secret group key. SAR aug-
ments the routing process using hash digests
and symmetric encryption mechanisms. The
signed hash digests provide message integrity,
while the encryption of packets ensures their
confidentiality. SAR’s advantage is that it will
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find the optimal route, such that all the nodes
on the shortest path satisfy the security require-
ments. Its disadvantage is that it may fail to
find the route if the ad hoc network does not
have a path on which all nodes on the path sat-
isfy the security requirements in spite of being
connected. TSRF (Trust-Aware Secure Rout-
ing Framework) [24] is a lightweight and trust
based scheme to deal with attacks. It tries to
combine the trust value with the other QoS met-
rics. It works well in dense networks and to mit-
igate greyhole attacks. It does not deal with the
energy constraint and it cannot mitigate other
attacks like wormhole and byzantine.
The incentive based security scheme presents
a brief description of proposed schemes which
attempt to stimulate cooperation among selfish
nodes by providing incentives to the network
nodes. In [3] an incentive-based system for
stimulating cooperation in MANETs has been
proposed. The scheme requires each network
node to have a tamper resistant hardware mod-
ule called security module. The security mod-
ule maintains a counter, called nuglet counter,
which decreases when a node sends a packet as
the originator, and increases when a node for-
wards a packet. Sprite: A Simple, Cheat-Proof,
Credit-Based System for MANETs [25], pro-
vides incentive for MANET nodes to cooperate
and report actions honestly. Sprite requires a
centralized entity called Credit Clearance Ser-
vice (CCS) which determines the charge and
credit involved in sending a message. However,
these schemes require tamper resistant hardware
and on-line access to a centralized entity; there-
fore, these schemes are limited in their applica-
tions.
The detection and isolation secure scheme re-
moves malicious nodes from the network effec-
tively. In [26] a scheme for mitigating the pres-
ence of MANET nodes, that agree to forward
packets, but it fails to do so, is presented. The
scheme utilizes a “watchdog” for identifying
misbehaving nodes and a “pathrater” for avoid-
ing those nodes. However, it might not detect a
misbehaving node in the presence of ambiguous
collisions, receiver collisions, limited transmis-
sion power, false misbehavior, collusion, and
partial dropping. A scheme in [27] does not pro-
vide protection against false accusations. The
techniques in [28], [29] are ineffective against
intelligent adversaries, which selectively drop
packets, since the probing packets are not com-
pletely indistinguishable from other data pack-
ets [30]. Modified Dynamic Source Routing
Protocol (MDSR) [31] is a non-cryptographic
and energy efficient solution for gray-hole at-
tacks. In this protocol, the destination node
detects the presence of malicious nodes and
isolates them from the network by means of
an intrusion detection system IDS. These IDS
nodes will only listen in the presence of attack,
hence lesser energy loss. However, this scheme
does not deal with the battery power of the non-
IDS nodes. There can be intelligent malicious
nodes which detect these IDS nodes and avoid
these nodes. By making few nodes as IDS, it is
reducing the resource, hence the traffic on the
non-IDS nodes increases eventually taxing their
battery power.
3. AFSR Model
In this paper we use Willingness of a node and
the Fidelity to select one most secure Admin
node, which will be responsible for the transfer
of data packets for that node.
3.1. Willingness
Each node, before broadcasting a Neighbor
Searching (NS) packet, calculates its own Will-
ingness by Equation 1. The Willingness in-
dicates acceptability of that node to be an ad-
ministrator. The node receiving this NS packet
counts the Willingness of that node to decide its
own Admin node.
W = f (P, C, S) = ( ·P)+( ·C)+(·R) (1)
Where:
• ,  ,  are the weight factors of normaliza-
tion such that Equations 2 and 3 are satisfied.
0 < ,  , <= 1 (2)
 +  +  = 1 (3)




Rated capacity of the node
· 100 (4)
• C: is the coverage area of the node (in %).
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C =
No. of 2 hop neighbors − No. of 1 hop neighbor which are also 2 hop
Total No. of Nodes − 2 · 100 (5)
The nodes in the neighbor table are known as 1
Hop nodes, while the neighbors of these neigh-
boring nodes are called 2 Hop neighbors. The
2-Hop neighbor node information is received
during the Neighbor Searching process, since a
node sends its Neighbor Table while broadcast-
ing an NS packet. The coverage area of a node
is the measure of a node’s ability to reach to
other nodes.
• S: is signal stability of the node with all its








Sli and Sf i are the last and first signal strength of
the ith node respectively, while N is the number
of nodes currently present in the neighbor table,
since the nodes are present in the neighbor table,
Sf i = 0. Moreover, we say that the link with the
node is stable if Sli ≥ Sf i. The stability of a link
will depend onmany factors, like distance, path-
loss and others. Thus, if we consider the thresh-
old levels of IEEE 802.11b, we can get a range
for the numerator in Equation 4. With RADIO-
TX-THRESHOLDas−40 dB andRADIO-RX-
THRESHOLD as −111 dB [32][33] we get a
range from [−0.65, 1.75].
To make these three parameters comparable,
we scale these three values on a scale of 10.
The three weight factors will depend on differ-
ent physical conditions [34]. Different types of
application have different requirements; hence,
the valueswill change in different circumstances.
For our simulation, we have chosen 4 cases
CBR, FTP, TELNET and Default (Optimum),
as shown in Table 1. We then calculate the
best weight factor based on the highest Packet
Delivery Fraction (PDF) in GloMoSim.
A bound for the Willingness is necessary to im-
prove the PDF and decrease the number of inca-
pable candidates for Admin selection. We have
observed for a simulation environment as men-
tioned in Section 4, that a node should have at
least 30% or above battery value, and at least
one 2 Hop neighbor, and has a positive stabil-
ity to carry on with its task. Considering these





     
CBR 0.2 0.2 0.6 0.49 0.5 0.3 0.2
0.5 0.3 0.2 0.79
0.3 0.5 0.2 0.55
0.6 0.1 0.3 0.39
FTP 0.2 0.2 0.6 0.49 0.4 0.3 0.3
0.5 0.3 0.2 0.59
0.4 0.3 0.3 0.61
0.2 0.5 0.3 0.45
TEL 0.2 0.2 0.6 0.49 0.3 0.4 0.3
NET 0.5 0.3 0.2 0.59
0.3 0.4 0.3 0.71
0.1 0.6 0.3 0.88
Default 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.8 0.33 0.33 0.33
minimum requirements, we get the Willingness
threshold W0 as shown in Equation 7.





·  + 4 ·  (7)
3.2. Fidelity
Fidelity [35] is a counter, which keeps track of
the number of correctly received and verified ac-
knowledgement packets (ACK). The value in-
creases only if the ACK is received and verified
within a time-period, orelse the value decreases.
Hence, fidelity can be summarized as a mea-
sure of the past behaviour of an Admin node as
shown in Equations 8 and 9.
 = f (Reception of ACK within time ) (8)
Where,
 = 2 · Average Delay · Hop Count (9)
Initially all nodes have fidelity assigned as 0.
This value helps a node to select anAdmin node,
based on the past activities with that node.
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If a node with a high fidelity value suddenly be-
haves maliciously, then it will take a lot of time
for that node to get its fidelity decreased and
get replaced by another non-malicious Admin
node. Hence, a maximum limit on fidelity must
be calculated. Again, a node that repeatedly
fails to send ACK packet back to the origina-
tor node should not be considered as an Admin
node. Similarly, a minimum limit should also
be imposed.
a) Maximum Value: With maxε{1, 3, 5, 7, 9}
for 10, 20, 30 nodes we calculated the time
required for a node to select a new Admin
node, after the previous Admin node with the
maximum fidelity starts malicious behavior, as
shown in Table 2. It is obvious that the higher
the max fidelity, the higher time will be required
to decrease its fidelity and choose a new Admin
node. In a competitive environment, where ma-
jority nodes in the neighbor table have fidelity
close to each other, the change in Admin node
is quite frequent. Therefore, to see the effect at
worst case, we consider a situation where a sin-
gle node has reached maximum fidelity, while
other nodes are yet to start communication, i.e,
the fidelity is 0 for other nodes. Let us assume
a network with Uniform node placement and
with Random waypoint mobility, with the Node
Traversal Time T = 5 ms. Since our protocol’s
aim is security, and we would like to isolate the
malicious node as fast as possible, we consid-
ered the max = 3, which is evident from Table
2. Moreover, the choice of 1 and 2 will be too
fast and harsh for the network.
Table 2. Time required (in ms) to select a new
Admin node.
Nodes
max 1 3 5 7 9
10 125 425 650 875 1025
20 500 2125 3300 4600 5150
30 700 2750 4050 5800 6300
b) Minimum Value: With  min ε {−1, −3,
−5, −7, −9} for 10, 20, 30 nodes we cal-
culate the PDF, after a node has reached the
minimum fidelity, and continues to drop the
packets, as shown in Table 3. To maximize
security, we would like to isolate the malicious
node as soon as possible and with minimum loss
in packets. However, due to mobile nature of
the nodes, a node can face loss due to constant
make and break of links. Therefore, anything
within −5(= min) is acceptable as it gives a
50% PDF.
Table 3. Packet delivery fraction with different
values of min.
Nodes
max –1 –3 –5 –7 –9
10 0.8 0.72 0.6 0.4 0.15
20 0.75 0.65 0.51 0.33 0.08
30 0.60 0.60 0.52 0.25 0.05
3.3. Combining Willingness and Fidelity
Since both quantities are important for deciding
the choice of an Admin node, our protocol tries
to select a node with high Willingness and Fi-
delity. To do so, we divide both values into two
zones, namely High and Low. The preference
factor  is a function of the two parameters as
shown in Equation 10.
 = f (W,) (10)
Our protocol initially checks whether the nodes
have Willingness more than the threshold level,
so theWillingness value ranging from the thresh-
old value W0 to maximum value of 10 can be










We can select the high and low ranges for Fi-
delity in a similar fashion. We consider the
range of fidelity, i.e.,  ε [−5, 3], as explained
above. Therefore, the high and low levels can be
written as Equations 13 and 14. Since, initially
all nodes will have fidelity 0, it is considered as
a part of low range.
Highε(0, 3] (13)
Lowε(−5, 0] (14)
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With Equations 11 − 14 we can calculate the
preference factor  as shown in Table 4. The
node with the least  is selected as the Admin
node.






A node A with (W, ) combination as (Low,
High) is preferred over a node with (High,
Low), since the goal of the protocol is to select
the most secure Admin node. If there is a tie,
then the node with highest Fidelity is selected.
If tie still prevails, then any random node from
the competing nodes can be selected.
4. Overall Algorithm
4.1. Admin Selection Process
The overall algorithm starts with a node search-
ing process for its neighbors by broadcasting a
Neighbor Searching Packet (NS). This packet
has the originator id along with its Neighbor ta-
ble, and its Willingness. When a node receives
this packet, it updates its Neighbor 2-Hop ta-
ble (i.e. the 2 hop neighbors). The receiving
node then, along with its Willingness, broad-
casts the NS packet as a response. These NS
packets are sent periodically, after a time in-
terval T. This is essential in a mobile network
like MANET, where there are constant make
and break of links. Hence, the neighbor table,
along with the neighbor 2-Hop table, needs to
be periodically updated.
After a node receives replies to the NS packet,
it starts the Admin selection process. The node
with the highest preference factor (i.e., least 
value) is selected as the Admin node. This
single node will now be responsible for all
the selector node’s traffic. The selector node
then broadcasts an Admin Packet, so that all
the neighboring nodes, including the selected
node, come to know about its Admin, and that
a bidirectional link exists between itself and the
selected Admin node. The process is shown
through a flowchart in Figure 3.
Figure 3. Flowchart for Admin selection.
A node can only have one Admin, but a node
can be the Admin of multiple nodes. Therefore,
to keep a track of it, an Admin Selector Set
is maintained by each node. The node, which
is selected as an admin node updates its Ad-
min Selector Set. With each update of this set,
a broadcast of the Admin Selector Set Packet
is stimulated. The Admin Selector Set packet
shares the information about Admin Selector
Set of an admin, so that other nodes can up-
date their Connection table and build their rout-
ing table accordingly. However, a non-admin
neighbor node, on receiving the Admin packet,
will also update their Connection Table.
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To summarize the Admin selection process, a
node needs to consider the following rules:
• A node cannot select a node as an Admin if
that node belongs to the Admin Selector Set,
thus preventing any kind of parallel edges;
• The node selects only that neighbor node as
an Admin, which has the highest preference
of Willingness and fidelity combined;
• After selecting anAdmin, a node also checks
the Connection Table, such that no loop is
formed on its choice of Admin. If a loop ex-
ists, then the next best Admin is considered.
AFSR selects only one Admin node; hence, the
duplication of Admin Selector Set packets is de-
creased. This packet needs to be digitally signed
so that the receiving node can authenticate the
information and the identity of the sender. This
is essential, as this is the base for creation of
the Routing Table. If the Routing table is built
based on spurious results generated by mali-
cious nodes, then the whole routing might fail,
and the loss of packets will increase a lot.
4.2. Admin Routing
The Connection Table is a collection of all the
node and Admin pairs that exist in the network,
which a node comes to know through the Admin
packet and Admin Selector Set packets. The
Routing table is built by tracing these connected
pairs, from a potential destination node to itself,
through different Admin nodes, as presented in
the Connection Table. If X is the destination
node, with S as the source and (Y, X), (S, Z),
(Z, Y), i.e, (last hop, admin node) are entries
in the Connection Table of S, then the path in
the Routing Table would be, S→Z→Y→X. The
source node now forwards the data packet via
the Admin node (in this case node Z) to send it
to the destination node (node X).
A source node adds its node id to theMSG.PATH
and updates the size of the data packet to reflect
the modified path. The node then encrypts the
message to be sent with the public key of the
destination node so that it can be decrypted only
with the private key of the destination node.
The sender calculates the HASH value of the
encrypted message to ensure whether the actual
message is sent to the destination node or not.
The sender node maintains a PATHLIST table
which also has the HASH value of the encrypted
message and the next hop id to keep a record of
the node to which it is sending the data for trans-
mission to the destination. It sets a timer and
waits for the Acknowledgement (ACK) packet
to arrive. If the time out occurs and the sender
does not receive an acknowledgement, then it
decreases the trust value of the nodes present in
neighbor table, and selects a new ADMIN node.
The process is shown and explained through a
flowchart in Figure 4.
Figure 4. Flowchart for Source node.
On receiving the encrypted message from its
previous node, the very first and foremost thing
that the node performs is check whether the
node from which it receives the message is
present in the MSG.PATH. If the node id match-
es, then it makes an entry to its PATHLIST the
Hash value of themessage and theNEXT HOP
ID+MSG. PATH data. It adds its id to the
MSG.PATH and updates the message packet
size, as to reflect the updated path. Then it
forwards the message to its Admin node. If the
node id does not match, then it drops the packet
and decreases the trust value of the sender node.
This process continues, and when the destina-
tion node receives the data, it extracts the PATH
from the MSG.PATH of the message. It de-
crypts the message using its own private key. It
now creates a hash value for acknowledgement
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generated by hashing the encrypted message,
thereby signing the acknowledgement message
with its own private key and transmits it to the
previous node in the PATH. The ACK packet
traces back to the source node through the same
path.
On receiving the ACK packet, each of the Ad-
min nodes increases the fidelity of the next-hop
(its Admin) by 1, which signifies a successful
transmission, otherwise decreases fidelity and
the Admin selection is performed again. The
process for an Admin is shown in Figure 5.
Figure 5. Flowchart for Admin node.
5. Results and Discussions
We have made a comparative study with Se-
cured OLSR, SAODV, ARAN, ARIADNE and
our protocol AFSR on Glomosim. We chose
these algorithms, since they are all well known
secured routing protocols.
The simulation parameters are shown in Table
5. In the simulation, we have considered some
assumptions:
• Weneglect over-hearing of peer-to-peer pack-
ets. The RTS/CTS option is turned off in the
MAC layer;
• Any given intermediate node on a path from
a source to a destination may be malicious
and therefore cannot be fully trusted;
• The source node only trusts a destination
node, and a destination node only trusts a
source node. So, the source and the destina-
tion cannot be malicious;
• We have also used a new self organized key
management [36] which uses lesser memory
space.
Table 5. Simulation parameters.
Parameters Values
SIMULATION-TIME 500 seconds
























DATA PACKET TYPE CBR
DATA PACKET SIZE 20 bytes
CRYPTOGRAPHIC
ALGORITHM RSA (512 bit)
SOURCE NODE NODE 3
DESTINATION NODE NODE 5
MALICIOUS NODES 30%
max, min 3 − 5
,  ,  0.5,0.3,0.2
40 R. Singh et al.
In Figure 6 we see the average number of Ad-
min node selections throughout the simulation.
Since only Secure OLSR uses ADMIN concept,
we see that our protocol elects lesser number of
Admin nodes. Each node in our protocol selects
one node as an Admin, and due to malicious ac-
tivities these Admins might have to be changed.
The average lands to around 1.58 for AFSR.
Decreasing the number of Admin nodes selec-
tion decreases the routing overhead since lesser
broadcast will be required. It even decreases
the packet collision at the radio layer.
Figure 6. Average ADMIN Count.
The packet delivery fraction (PDF) is the mea-
sure of total number of received data packets
over total number of sent data packets. In be-
nign environment the packet delivery fraction is
slightly lesser than secured OLSR, due to the se-
lection of a single Admin node. However, with
fidelity in malicious environment AFSR has a
greater PDF. The PDF of AFSR is greater than
other secured routing protocols in both environ-
ments, since we consider battery, coverage and
link stability as essential parameters, while se-
lection of a node is considered an Admin node.
Hence, there are greater losses of data packets
in ARAN and SAODV, ARIADNE compared
to AFSR, as shown in Figures 7 and 8.
Figure 7. Packet delivery fraction in benign
environment.
Figure 8. Packet delivery fraction in malicious
environment.
The normalized routing load (NRL) is the mea-
sure of the number of sent routing packets over
the number of received data packets. Lesser
Admin node selection helps to decrease the av-
erage routing load. Moreover, AFSR has a
comparable NRL with respect to other secure
on-demand routing protocol in benign environ-
ment, as shown in Figure 9. Even in a ma-
licious environment, AFSR maintains a lesser
NRL compared to secure OLSR, as shown in
Figure 10.
Figure 9. Normalize routing load in benign
environment.
Figure 10. Normalize routing load in malicious
environment.
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The End-to-End Delay is the average time re-
quired for delivering data packets to the destina-
tion. AFSR shows the least delay compared to
other protocols, since the most reliable routes
are selected through willingness, as shown in
Figure 11. Moreover, with the introduction of
malicious nodes, AFSR maintains an average
delay, as shown in Figure 12.
Figure 11. End to End delay in benign environment.
Figure 12. End to End delay in malicious environment.
6. Conclusion
Our presented protocol is a very light-weight
routing algorithm and it provides very good se-
curity against Black-Hole, gray hole, Jellyfish
and Blackmail attacks. While simulating in
GloMoSim, we have observed that our proto-
cols work best in a malicious environment as
compared to other existing secured protocols
mentioned in literature. However, our proposed
protocol has a greater End-to-End delay than
other protocols, but it has a greater packet deliv-
ery fraction (PDF) and lower normalized rout-
ing load (NRL) in the same environment. This
tradeoff helps in making the protocol secure at
a lower cost of packet transmission, lower over-
head and lower battery consumption. Due to
high dependence on Administrator node and the
inherent disadvantages in the proactive type of
routing in MANET, this protocol can further
be used in reactive protocols, to mitigate their
disadvantages.
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